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At its core, offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in America's overseas military deployments and alliance commitments and a shift toward greater restraint in U.S. foreign policy writ large. It is based on the seemingly counterintuitive idea that this type of retrenchment actually will produce security outcomes at a better price-that when it comes to grand strategy, less will actually be more.
"Less is more" is always a tempting proposition, and the attraction seems particularly strong of late. For at least a decade, offshore balancing has represented the preferred grand strategy for many international relations scholars of the realist persuasion, including eminent analysts like Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Christopher Layne. In the aftermath of the Iraq War and the global financial crisis of 2007-08, the overall visibility and popularity of the concept have increased further still. The appeal of offshore balancing has "jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policymaking," wrote one proponent of the concept in 2012; the case for a "dramatic strategic retrenchment" is gaining strength.
2 Offshore balancing, another leading scholar adds, represents "an idea whose time has come." 3 Offshore balancing is indeed a concept with significant currency in the ongoing debate on the future of American grand strategy. Unfortunately, assessments of that concept have often been one-sided and incomplete. Because offshore balancing commands such strong backing within the academic strategic studies community, and because it is generally advanced as part of a critique of America's existing grand strategy, analysts have too rarely treated that proposal with the sort of sustained, in-depth scrutiny that is required to adequately judge both its advantages and its limitations. 4 The aim of this monograph is to redress that asymmetry through a critical assessment that explicates the core premises and rationale of offshore balancing in some detail, and then more vigorously probes its principal claims. The time is ripe for this sort of examination. The coming years will undoubtedly confront American officials with choices of great importance regarding U.S. global posture and policy. A more rigorous evaluation of prominent grand strategic ideas and alternatives is thus vital. 5 The outcomes of such an evaluation cast serious doubt on the desirability, and even the basic viability, of offshore balancing. That strategy derives its attraction from the idea, as Walt has argued, that it will allow America to increase its national security and influence, while also decreasing "the resistance that its power sometimes provokes." 6 In reality, however, offshore balancing promises far more than it can
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deliver. The probable benefits of that approach-both financial and geopolitical-are frequently exaggerated, while the likely disadvantages and dangers are far more severe than its proponents acknowledge. Offshore balancing ultimately hinges on a series of shaky and often unpersuasive claims about what the world would look like subsequent to a major retraction of American power. Once those claims come under close scrutiny, the appeal of offshore balancing crumbles. In all likelihood, adopting this strategy would not allow the United States to achieve more security and influence at a lower price. The more plausible results would be to dissipate American influence, to court heightened insecurity and instability, and to expose the United States to greater longrange risks and costs.
This monograph proceeds as follows. First, I briefly outline the basic parameters and rationale of the postwar (and now, post-Cold War) grand strategy that offshore balancers criticize. Second, I unpack the logic, claims, and purported benefits of offshore balancing itself. Third, and at greatest length, I critically scrutinize what effects a shift to offshore balancing would likely have for U.S. interests across a range of important issues. Fourth, and finally, I summarize the findings of this monograph and briefly discuss the implications for current debates on American grand strategy.
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